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SIMPLICITY AND CREATION
Timothy O'Connor

According to many philosophical theologians, God is metaphysically simple:
there is no real distinction among His attributes or even between attribute and
existence itself. Here, I consider only one argument against the simplicity thesis. Its proponents claim that simplicity is incompatible with God's having created another world, since simplicity entails that God is unchanging across possible worlds. For, they argue, different acts of creation involve different willings, which are distinct intrinsic states. 1 show that this is mistaken, by sketching an adequate account of reasons-guided activity that does not require distinct intrinsic states of willing corresponding to each possible act of creation.

I Introduction
According to many philosophical theologians, God is metaphysically simple: there is no real distinction among His attributes or even between
attribute and existence itself. God's omniscience is not distinct from His
omnipotence, which is not distinct from His necessary existence ... which is
not distinct from God Himself. Even those who affirm this thesis recognize
that it is a hard saying. But the reflective theist will also recognize that, hard
as this saying is, there are some fairly weighty considerations in its favor.
One such consideration stems from the implications of the concept of
absolutely necessary being. This concept not only underlies an important
theistic argument, it is also, I believe, a necessary feature of a coherent concept of God, given its connection to a minimal understanding of God's sovereignty over all things.' The path some philosophers trace from necessary
being to simplicity runs roughly as follows: for a being to exist of absolute
necessity, there can be no contingent facts about its essential nature.
Necessary existence cannot just happen to be conjoined with omnipotence
in this being, for instance, because in that case there would be no possibility
of explaining why these two attributes were coinstantiated. So there must
be a tight unity to its nahlre, such that each of its attributes entails the others. The only intelligible way this might be is if the relation between "attributes" (including necessary existence) is that of identity. And if its essential
nature is metaphysically simple, (it is further argued that) it cannot have
any contingent intrinsic attributes, either.
I believe that this argument is resistible. In particular, while 1 accept the
argument that a necessary being's nature must be tightly unified, I do not
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see why this cannot fall short of the limiting case of simplicity. But that is
not to say that I see how its nature could have the requisite unity while
falling short of simplicity. It is a puzzling notion, and there are no obvious
strong analogies to guide one's intuitions. Some will take this as evidence
that the simplicity thesis is true, despite its perplexing character. I will not
try to argue this matter one way or the other here. Instead, I merely want to
consider one argument that has been given to discredit the simplicity thesis
and to show that it is mistaken.
According to that argument, simplicity is incompatible with the possibility that God might have created another world (or not have created at all).
The reason is that God's having created differently (or not having created)
entails a corresponding difference in His intrinsic state. For He would had
to have decided or willed to have acted in that different fashion, and deciding to create one world necessarily differs, intrinsically, from deciding to
create a very different world. So either God is not metaphysically simple or
His creating this world is somehow bound up with His very being. And
this last is both impious and absurd. I will rebut this reasoning by sketching
a plausible model of God's intentional agency on (what the simplicity theorist will view as) the "naive" assumption that God is not metaphysically
simple. I will then show that, surprisingly, this model can be modified in a
way that leaves intact certain essential elements while making it compatible
with the simplicity thesis.

II The "naive" model of God's intentional agency
A model of God's agency should show how creation issues from God in a
way that is explainable in terms of a purpose or desire He had when acting.
The issues involved in giving an account of intentional explanations are
numerous and difficult. Accordingly, I claim to show only that there is a not
obviously unworkable way in which this might go in God's case, the details
of which must be developed elsewhere. 2 Though seemingly modest, this
will be task enough, as the form of intentional explanation that is needed
here is one which has been widely thought discredited in relation to human
action. This has been a mistake, in my view, but in any case the most pressing problems for the application of the account to human action are empirical, not conceptual, and stem from assumptions concerning human beings
and the wider natural order that need not be made in relation to a transcendent necessary being.
In recent philosophy, the most popular account of the way reasons
explain human action is the causal theory of action. Broadly speaking, the
causal theory holds that some bodily behavior of mine is an action only if it
is a causal consequence, in an appropriate manner, of factors prominently
including my having a reason to do so. Bodily movements that are not a
causal consequence of reasons are mere movements (as with reflexive
movements). Thus, an agent's control over his activity is taken to reside in
the causal efficacy of his reasons. Now, many would suppose that this is not
simply a correct picture of the way reasons explain human actions, but a
conceptual truth about acting for reasons. To deny that certain of an agent's
reasons cause his intentional action, such philosophers aver, would be to
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render it utterly fortuitous from the standpoint of the agent himself.
This is not at all obvious, however. I will assume without argument here
that the notion of causation rests on a notion of causal capacities as ontologically basic. (Causal capacities are not reducible to patterns of actual or counterfactual regularity, nor are they explainable in terms of occurrent relations
among universals.)' Once one recognizes that this is so, there is no conceptual bar to the thought that the way in which capacities are manifested or
exercised may differ in important and general respects. We have come successfully to treat impersonal objects and systems of objects "mechanistically", i.e., to understand them as having the basis of their capacities in their
underlying nahlres - their chemical, physical, or genetic constitutions and
dynamical structures - and as manifesting these powers in observable
effects as a matter of course in suitable circumstances. On this broad conception, circumstances prompt the exercise of such a power by, e.g., stimulating a latent mechanism to action or by removing inhibitors to the activity of
a poised mechanism. The causal theory of action extends this mechanistic
paradigm to human agency by treating the state of having a reason to act as
partly constituting a mechanism of this kind, requiring only the right sort of
occasion to give rise to an action of the corresponding sort.
How might a contrasting, non-mechanistic picture of God's agency go?
There are various complicating issues here, and thus my treatment will be
quite sketchy. On the naive model, God's activity in generating a contingent
order is to be thought of, in the first instance, as the direct causing of an
internal state of intention that a particular determinate state of affairs obtain.
This is not, importantly, to be treated as an elliptical expression for there
being some prior state in God that brings about, in rneclumistic fashion, His
corning to have the intention. Rather, the intention is irreducibly a product
of God as a free agent. This implies as a corollary that the causal power that
is manifested in such a case is of a different sort from the mechanistic variety describable by mathematical functions from circumstances to effects (or
from circumstances to ranges of effects, in cases of probabilistic, rather than
deterministic, causation).
I won't discuss further this contentious notion of personal or agent causation. I will assume that the reader will grant that it is a coherent basic concept, whatever one's view on its application to human beings. In its application to God, the explanatory framework it will engender is roughly this: Let
it be supposed that God has some purpose P and recognizes that creating
contingent order C would satisfy P. Suppose further that He subsequently
(at least in some causal! explanatory order of priority, if not a temporal one)
generated an intention whose content is that C obtain in order to fulfill P, and
that C's obtaining is itself an immediate product of that intention. In such a
circumstance, I claim, the core activity and its product are perfectly well
explained by reference to God's purpose and His belief that C would satisfy
it, without any assumption that the activity was necessary given the
explaining purpose and belief (collectively, "reason"), or even that they
made it probable. The explanatory connection comprises God's having
exercised a capacity to freely act for a purpose together with the two-fold
internal relation of the prior reason to the effective intention-they have a
common core content (that C satisfies P) and the intention directly refers to the
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reason. In short, to understand why God freely generates this intention, one
need only identify its reasons-bearing content. This contrasts with a mechanistic model of intentional action on which an agent's purposes or desires
and beliefs explain the choice, or formation of an intention, solely in terms
of an external, causal relationship to it. But it is readily understandable in its
own terms."

1111ntentional Explanation and the Simplicity Thesis
Can the basic model of God's intentional agency just sketched be amended to
accommodate the simplicity doctrine? At first sight, this seems patently
hopeless. An essential feature of that explanatory framework is the fit of
content between prior reason states (such as purposes and beliefs) and the
agent's ultimate decision, or intention to act here and now. If God's willing
this particular order of things is contingent, then it might have been different. This contradicts the absolute simplicity thesis, as it implies that an
aspect of God's intrinsic nature in this world - His state of intention that our
world obtain - might have been different, though God Himself would still
have existed, which implies that God is distinct from this actual state of
intention.
Thomas Aquinas recognized that the simplicity thesis had striking consequences for the understanding of God's creation, when he spoke of the creation relation as "real for creatures," while "unreal [or merely notional] for
God." If God strictly is His utterly simple nature, then, in Himself, He must
be utterly tmchanging across all possible circumstances. There might have
been any number of different contingent orders, and in each such case, the
contingent reality would have causally depended on God. Yet God Himself
would have been intrinsically the same. That is the point of speaking of the
creation relation as being merely notional for God: for unlike all cases
involving natural causes (including purposive, free agents), God's causal
influence does not require any intrinsic change on God's part.
Clearly, if we are to make sense of this, it cannot involve the idea that
there is anything like a state of intention whose intrinsic nature would have
varied in accordance with the state of affairs intended. Yet it just might be
that the basic explanatory framework outlined above could, after all, be
applied within a simplicity account by simply deleting the notion of a distinct, causally effective state of intention that C obtain in order to fulfill P, and
substituting in its place C itself, i.e., the actual contingent order. The idea
here is to treat the executive state of intention as an inessential middleman
in the causal process of purposive agency. God doesn't form an intention to
create our world and consequently do so, He creates the world directly. His
activity entirely consists in a causal relation between Himself, who is
unchanging, and the dependent, contingent reality. The role of matching
the intentional content of logically prior reasons tl1at a state of intention
plays within our original model is taken over by the concrete reality at which
those states are directed. Its nature, too, mirrors the intentional content of
the explaining reason.
One might understandably worry at this point that this move makes the
cognitive aspect of God's agency mysteriously alien, to the point that we've
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lost our intuitive grip on the model. For on it, there's just (i) an agent with
reasons for various possible creations, and (ii) a relation of dependency
between that agent and the actual creation, such that the product might
have been utterly different, and the agent utterly the same. Surely, one
wants to say, at some point God has to decide, to intend, to will, or what
have you that this particular creation be actualized.
But consider our original, and more familiar model. On that model, God
has reasons corresponding to different possible courses of action, and then
causes a state of intention corresponding to one, which state in tum causes
the intended contingent order. That is: there is (i) an agent with reasons for
various possible creations, and (ii) a relation of dependency between that
agent and the actual intention (which results in the creation), such that the
intention might have been utterly different, and the agent (until just prior to
the intention in the order of explanation) utterly the same. Whatever mystery resides in conceiving the dependency between God and creation in the
intention-less, simplicity-based model is perhaps equally present between
agent and intention in the original model. But I would prefer to say that
there is no mystery (here, at any rate) in either model. It only appears to be
so if one misunderstands the role of an intention by thinking of it as the ultimate locus of personal agency - as a state in virtue of which all subsequent
immediate effects are to be attributed to the agent as His effects, as aspects
of His action. Within the broadly agent-causal account of which both models are particular versions, the locus of agency is not within some special
kind of intrinsic state, but rather within the exercise of causal power in bringing about such a state (or an external state of affairs, as on the simplicitybased model).
If this is right, one might ask what the function is of discrete states of intention in agents who have them (such as ourselves). But the answer is obvious
enough on a moment's thought: they are central to the guiding of actions
within ordinary purposive agents. Our actions perforce involve enormously
complex chains of microphysical events within and around us. The having
of separate, content-bearing states of intention for each action is a way of harnessing such causal mechanisms within our bodies and environment, often
triggering into action mechanistically-encoded, latent action routines - think
of the unconscious completion of a complicated dance routine - and always
guiding the completion of behavior through complex feedback mechanisms.
Such functions are presumably unnecessary in God's case.
At this point, I should address a possible misunderstanding one might
have concerning the model of God's agency I am proposing on behalf the
simplicity theorist. It may seem that the model is committed to denying that
willing is in any sense an attribute of God. This would be passing strange
for an account of irreducibly personal agency and is contrary to the express
claims of most simplicity theorists. 5 Is it not commonly held that willing
Himself is part of God's essence and that in willing Himself He wills created reality?
My account is compatible with these claims. First, my model has indicated nothing about God's intrinsic, simple nature other than its embodying
reasons for creating each of those contingent orders that are possible. Let us
suppose, then, that an involuntary willing of - a wanting or appetite" for U
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Himself, the supreme good, is an "aspect" of God's rich, yet metaphysically
simple nature. Can we further speak of God as willing that this world exist,
given that He has caused it to be? We can, although we must take care to
understand just what such a willing is on the account. Unlike a human willing or decision that something be the case, it will not be or involve a distinctive intrinsic state of God. Recall the "naive" model of God's agency and
suppose that it correctly captured the essential feature of human free
agency. If so, we might naturally say that human decisions of this sort were
the causally complex events of the agent's causing an intrinsic state of intention
that 0. The constituent intention would be distinct from other states of the
agent and mark a change in the agent from his previous cognitive state. On
the simplicity doctrine, God is not other than His simple, intrinsic state. So
God's willing of this world will not involve such an internal change.
Instead, it will be the circumstance of God's creating the world to satisfy some
purpose. Had God created differently, the only difference would be in the
contingent order, not in God. If we chose to speak in terms of a "relational
attribute" of God, rather than of the state of affairs of His being causally
related to the world, then we would say that God's willing this world is His
being its creator - which, intrinsically, is nothing other than His essence of
willing Himself.
In dealing with the simplicity thesis, we must be careful in this way to
separate God's intrinsic from his relational properties. Otherwise, we might
be tempted to say that even our amended model is not compatible with
God's being the same regardless of what world He happened to create. For
does He not have in our own world the inessential properties of having created this world and having willed to create this world? As we've seen, if the
amended model of God's agency is correct, the presence or absence of these
properties implies no intrinsic difference in God, no more than the presence
or absence of the property being ten feet away from Theaetetus implies an
intrinsic difference in Socrates.
A final matter I will briefly consider here is whether my simplicity-based
model of God's purposive agency is compatible with the possibility that He
might not have created anything at all. Norman Kretzmann has argued in
the context of Aquinas's theological system that there is strong pressure to
say that God must have created something or other, though it may well
have been open to Him to create any of a number of contingent orders.6 The
reason is that there is no plausible account of how an absolutely perfect God
might have a resistible motivation - one consideration among other, competing considerations - for creating something rather than nothing. (It obviously cannot have to do with any sort of utility, for example.) The best general
understanding of God's being motivated to create at all - one which in
places Aquinas himself comes very close to endorsing - is to see it as reflecting the fact that God's very being, which is goodness, necessarily diffuses
itself. Perfect goodness will naturally communicate itself outwardly; God
who is perfect goodness will naturally create, generating a dependent reality that imperfectly reflects that goodness.
I find this claim highly plausible. Even if one rejected this claim, however, it is difficult to envision a coherent scenario in which God eternally
chooses not to create. On my model, for example, God's positively willing
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not to create requires His having some reason for not doing so. As
Kretzmann asks, what kind of reason could that be? God could not benefit
from that choice. One might suggest that rather than positively choosing
not to create, God might have simply refrained from deciding one way or
other. This is a familiar circumstance for human beings, who often have a
motivation to uncover more relevant information, and sometimes stall in
the hope that the choice will be "taken from their hands." But there can be
no analogous factors in God. I am inclined, then, to judge that Kretzmann's
claim is correct. Fully motivating this position requires showing that it does
not compromise God's absolute independence of all things, but I will not
pursue this here.
IV Conclusion

I have tried to show how the simplicity theorist can make out an account of
God's contingent, purposive agency in creation. Even if I have been successful, an important worry remains about the apparent complexity of reason
states on the second model. (On it, remember, God has any number of distinct reasons for creating a variety of different possible worlds.) This is just a
special case of the more general worry about how to render intelligible the
idea that simplicity is compatible with a "richness" of nature in virtue of
which it is meaningful to speak of "(absolute) power," "knowledge," and a
host of other attributes in relation to such a being. I will have to leave this
very perplexing matter as an unresolved puzzle for the committed simplicity theorist - here I've merely tried to leave the simplicity doctrine in a little
better shape than I found iF

Indiana University
NOTES
1. I have argued this point in an unpublished lecture, "The God of
Abraham, Isaac, and Anselm?," which I gave at the University of St. Andrews
in April 1997.
2. I develop an account of the model I will give in the text (in relation to
human action) in my "Agent Causation," in T. O'Connor, ed., Agents, Causes,
and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995).
3. Problems with reductionist approaches are well known and have been
extensively discussed in the literature. TI1e higher-order-relation-among-universals approach has been independently advanced by Fred Dretske, David
Armstrong, and Michael Tooley. See "Laws of Nature" (Philosophy of Science 44,
(1977), 248-68), A World of States of Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1(97), and Causation: A Realist Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987),
respectively. I argue against this type of account in Causation and the Will
(unpublished manuscript).
4. Since Donald Davidson's essay, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," various theorists of action have given a number of reasons to suppose that accounts
of intentional explanation that do not appeal to the causal efficacy of the agent's
reasons must fail. I cannot address these worries here. But I have done so at
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length elsewhere. See my Agent Causation" (cited in note 2).
5.
See, for example, Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae Ia.19 and Summa
1/

Contra Gentiles 1.72-86.
6.
See most recently his Wilde Lectures, The Metaphysics of Theism:
Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles I (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1997), pp. 220-225.
7. This paper was developed from a briefer discussion of its topic within a
series of lectures 1 gave at the University of St. Andrews (in April 1997) under
the heading God and Ultimate Explanation. 1 thank the audience on that occasion,
especially John Haldane, Thomas 0'Andrea, and Tim Kenyon, for their comments. The research and writing of that material was supported by grants from
The Pew Evangelical Scholars Program and the Lord Gifford bequest at the
University of St. Andrews.

